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Original Article
In a Los Angeles Times article, “Putting the Dual-loyalty 
Myth to Rest,” Sergio Munoz (2006) lamented the assump-
tion that the unprecedented flow of immigrants from Mexico, 
the perceived widespread use of Spanish across the United 
States, and exaggerated Mexican flag-waving marches in 
Los Angeles may have collectively contributed to the pre-
vailing perception that political loyalties among recent immi-
grants, particularly among Latino immigrants, are divided 
between their native lands and the United States.
The controversy surrounding U.S. immigrants’ divided 
loyalty has had a long and contentious history in American 
political and social discourse (Espenshade and Hempstead 
1996; Ha 2010). One of the most significant anti-immigrant 
movements and general distrust of the foreign-born occurred 
during the early decades of the twentieth century, when in 
1904 the level of immigration from eastern and southern 
Europe hit 812,870 and then reached more than 1 million in 
1905 (Huebner 1906). By the 1920s, accusations of immi-
grants’ divided allegiances had culminated in the 1921 
Emergency Quota Act, which reduced immigration from 
southern and eastern Europe to less than 3 percent of prewar 
numbers, and later in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which led 
to even more restrictions on immigration. In fact, in deliberat-
ing the Johnson-Reed Act on the floor of the Senate, one sen-
ator went as far as to say “that the time has arrived when we 
should shut the door, otherwise, unchecked immigration will 
lead to war over resources, or that such immigrants will melt 
the pot in place of us being the melting pot” (Smith 1924).
During this era, concerns about immigrants’ dual loyalty 
and perceived lack of assimilation centered on the potential 
economic and cultural threats that eastern and southern 
European immigrants posed to traditional Anglo-Saxon 
American values. Ultimately, however, as a result of the 
Johnson-Reed Act and a later intensive Americanization pro-
cesses, and with active immigrant participation in public 
schools, trade unions, and politics, the perceived threat asso-
ciated with eastern and southern European immigrants 
waned significantly (Krampetsos 1995).
To some extent, Americans at different historical moments 
have been distrusting of what they perceive to be lower status 
immigrants, particularly at times when their presence threat-
ened the political and economic status quo. When most 
Americans were of northern and western European extraction, 
for example, the distrusted immigrants were southern and 
southeastern European. What is different today is that immigra-
tion discourse is informed by different social and demographic 
forces from those that characterized the late nineteenth-century 
and early twentieth-century European immigration wave. 
Prompted in part by the passage of the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act, this more recent wave of immigration has been 
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relatively larger and more racially and ethnically diverse than 
earlier waves. The size of the foreign-born population in the 
United States grew from just 9.6 million in 1965 to a record 
high of 45 million in 2015; the population increased almost 
three times from 1965 to 2015, by 5 percent and 14 percent, 
respectively (Chisti, Hipsman, and Ball 2015; see also Figure 
1).
Second, and more important, the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act contributed to a fundamental change in the 
source regions of immigrants to the United States, from Europe 
to South America and Central America, Asia, and to some extent 
Africa. Whereas nearly all top 10 source countries of immigra-
tion to the United States were European in 1960, none of the top 
10 today is in Europe; today, the top 10 source countries of 
immigration to the United States are in either South America 
and Central America or Asia (see Figure 2). The 1965 act in 
effect changed the racial makeup of the U.S. population from a 
significantly White majority to a racially diverse society.
One indirect effect of the size and racial composition of 
the contemporary immigration wave may be the increasing 
distrust of immigration and immigrants in general. This level 
of distrust has led to extremely restrictive immigration 
enforcement policies, including but not limited to the contro-
versial S.B. 1070 (Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhood Act), requiring police to verify the citizenship 
of anyone they suspect of being in the country illegally 
(Jones-Correa 2010). It is not a surprise, therefore, that 
immigration figured prominently in the 2012 national elec-
tion, created a postelection narrative that the outcome hinged 
on the unexpected turnout of Latino/a Americans because of 
their concerns about immigration, and strongly influences 
current anti-immigration political discourses. The current 
political crisis in the Middle East, the ISIS-inspired home-
grown terrorist attacks in San Bernardino, the spontaneous 
refugee crisis in Europe, and Republican Party frontrunner 
Donald Trump’s seemingly controversial comments about 
the existential danger immigration poses to the social and 
political fabric of the American community (Scherer 2015); 
all have escalated into a period of the most heightened dis-
trust and perceived immigrant disloyalty in the history of 
Figure 1. Annual number of U.S. legal permanent residents, fiscal years 1820 to 2013.
Sources: Chisti et al. (2015), Gibson and Lennon (1999).
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immigration discourse in the United States. Hence, there is 
significant indication that the American public perceives the 
level of contemporary immigration as a threat to labor mar-
ket stability (Borjas 1999) and to core American values 
(Huntington 2004).
More important, the controversy surrounding immigra-
tion has over the past few months taken a different twist, 
focused on immigration and divided loyalties, since Trump’s 
tacit suggestion that Ted Cruz, his rival for the Republican 
Party’s 2016 nomination, may not, after all, be eligible to 
hold the office because he was born in Canada to an American 
mother and a Cuban father. In what was dubbed the “birther 
issue,” Trump accused President Obama of being born in 
Kenya just eight years ago, during the 2008 presidential 
campaign, but this time, Trump is the Republican Party’s 
frontrunner, and he has a much larger following and greater 
influence; this time, constitutional scholars have weighed in 
on the subject of Cruz’s constitutional eligibility to be 
president.
As we finished the final draft of this article, Cruz had won 
the Iowa caucuses, despite Trump’s citizenship accusation. 
However, the idea of immigrants’ divided loyalties is part of 
a larger history of America’s contentious relationship with 
immigration and has over the past decade generated consid-
erable empirical scholarship on immigrants’ divided loyal-
ties and the supposed failure of time-honored American 
assimilation and political participation (Huntington 2004; 
Stanton, Jackson, and Canache 2007). Findings from the 
extant research range from authors who reject the premise 
that contemporary immigrants are less likely to assimilate, 
instead maintaining strong loyalties to their countries of ori-
gin (Rumbaut, Massey, and Bean 2006), those who support 
the argument that contemporary immigrants are less likely to 
assimilate and remain connected to American polity (Stanton 
et al. 2007), and finally those who suggest that the degree of 
immigrants’ political loyalties varies by social class and the 
political conditions in their countries of origin (de La Garza, 
Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Guarnizo 2003; Mar 2004; Pantoja 
2005; Smith 2007).
With very few exceptions, existing scholarship on immi-
grants’ dual loyalty concentrates on the actions, activities, 
and attitudes of immigrants and/or their homeland govern-
ments and completely ignores what nonimmigrant Americans 
think about the subject. Our purpose in this study is to extend 
Figure 2. Ten largest U.S. immigrant groups, 1960 and 2013.
Sources: Chisti et al. (2015), Gibson and Lennon (1999).
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the parameters of this discussion to include attitudes toward 
immigrants’ dual loyalty from the perspective of nonimmi-
grant Americans, that is, native persons with native parent-
age. We specifically ask, What are the cultural and political 
values, spatial and social locations, and immigration bound-
ary-making processes that inform Americans’ attitudes 
toward immigrants’ dual loyalty? This question is extremely 
important in that unless we have a meaningful understanding 
of nonimmigrant Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants’ 
dual loyalty in the context of reception, the discussion of 
whether immigrants are loyal or disloyal to core American 
values (Huntington 2004) is conceptually and theoretically 
incomplete. Moreover, conceptualizing dual loyalty in immi-
grants from the context of reception is even more important 
in that how nonimmigrant Americans perceive or understand 
dual loyalty provides an important window into our under-
standing of the processes of cultural and political member-
ship in American life and therefore will have a critical impact 
on the future conceptualization of the nature of assimilation 
and multiculturalism (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005).
Our ultimate aim in this research is therefore to attempt to 
explore a new line of conversation that can provide a pre-
liminary understanding of what nonimmigrant Americans 
think of the possibility of immigrants’ maintaining dual loy-
alty between their home countries and the United States. In 
the first part of the article, we provide a brief literature review 
concerning the extent to which recent immigrants engage in 
dual loyalties between their home countries and the United 
States. In the second section, we provide a tentative concep-
tualization of the idea of immigrants’ dual loyalty in general 
and from the perspective of nonimmigrant Americans. In the 
third section, we present the data and provide a discussion of 
the social and cultural values and the socioeconomic and 
demographic factors that inform nonimmigrants’ attitudes 
toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. In the fourth and final sec-
tion, we attempt to chart a tentative theoretical articulation of 
how the nature of immigrant loyalties may ultimately inform 
and reshape our understanding of assimilation and the extent 
to which undivided loyalty to core American values will 
remain an important criterion for cultural and political mem-
bership in American life.
Brief Literature Review
Academically, the increased controversy surrounding immi-
grants’ divided allegiance and political loyalties is partly 
fueled by Samuel Huntington’s (2004) Who Are We? The 
Challenges to America’s Identity. Huntington provided a list 
of postulates he claimed explain why Latino immigrants, 
particularly those from Mexico, are unlikely to assimilate 
into American core culture and therefore pose significant 
challenges to U.S. national identity. According to Huntington, 
Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans are unlikely to 
assimilate because the long, uncontrolled, and contiguous 
border between Mexico and the United States, which allows 
Mexican immigrants unrestricted immigration, and their spa-
tial concentrations within Spanish-speaking ethnic enclaves, 
which continuously reinforce their homeland cultures, will 
lead to their ambivalent allegiance to the United States. 
Furthermore, their identity politics represent an implicit 
claim to the American Southwest as historically part of 
Mexico (for similar arguments, see also Buchannan 2006; 
Fonte 2005), which is seen as affront to American national 
identity.
The central concern in the current literature on immigrant 
loyalty is the extent to which dual loyalty is perceived to 
foster divided allegiance between home and host countries 
(Baron 2009; Faist 2008; Fonte 2005; Huntington 2004; 
Kozak 2009; Nagel and Staeheli 2004; Stanton et al. 2007). 
The discussion surrounding the nature of immigrants’ dual 
loyalty can be divided into the “incompatibility” and “com-
patibility” theses. The incompatibility thesis suggests that 
this dual loyalty is incompatible with the American national 
identity and nationalism and therefore undermines incentives 
for cultural assimilation and political participation in the 
United States (Huntington 2004; Renshon 2001; Stanton 
et al. 2007). According to Stanton et al. (2007), Latino immi-
grants who maintain dual loyalties are less likely to be con-
nected to the American polity and less likely to participate in 
the American political process. The compatibility thesis 
instead suggests that dual loyalties and political ties to home-
land communities do not necessarily retard political partici-
pation or assimilation in the host community and that, in fact, 
the two activities are complementary (Escobar 2004; 
Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Kozak 2009). More 
important, the compatibility thesis suggests that understand-
ing the intersection between transnational migration and 
political loyalties is more complicated than just the incom-
patibility versus compatibility theses and involves the social 
contexts of exit and reception as well as individual socioeco-
nomic characteristics (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Portes, Escobar, 
and Arana 2009).
An important problem concerning conceptualizing immi-
grants’ dual loyalty from the perspective of nonimmigrant 
Americans is that no research tradition has yet explored non-
immigrant Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants’ dual 
loyalty, so there is no specific conceptual tradition to draw 
upon. In other words, neither the literature that concentrates 
on the actions, activities, and attitudes of immigrants and/or 
their homeland governments nor the research tradition that 
addresses attitudes toward immigration can provide a direct 
foundation for understanding nonimmigrants’ attitudes 
toward immigrants’ dual loyalty.
Given that there is no established research tradition of 
Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants’ divided loyalties, 
our purpose is to start a tradition on these attitudes from the 
perspective of nonimmigrant Americans. This research tradi-
tion will be distinctly different from the recent scholarship 
that concentrates on the actions, activities, and attitudes of 
immigrants and/or their homeland governments (de la Garza 
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et al. 1996; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Mar 2004; Pantoja 2005; 
Smith 2007) in that it focuses on the perceptions of nonim-
migrant Americans toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. This 
line of research is important for two reasons. First, it will 
enhance our understanding of which segment(s) of the 
American society oppose or support immigrants’ dual loy-
alty by way of social, political, and cultural values and eco-
nomic status. This conceptual extension is based on the 
assumption that if nonimmigrant Americans do not think that 
immigrants’ dual loyalty is a problem for American political 
identities and global political and economic interest, then the 
entire discussion about immigrants’ dual loyalty is conceptu-
ally and methodologically misplaced.
Conceptualizing Dual Loyalty
Dual loyalty, according to Baron (2009), refers to “the common 
emotional experience of being pulled in two different direc-
tions” (p. 1025). It involves the personal challenges of choos-
ing among different overriding moral, religious, and/or political 
commitments. It also involves the dilemma of not being sure if 
one is accepted into a particular moral, religious, or political 
community. In his classic essay, later published in The Souls of 
Black Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 1989) described the con-
flicting commitment dilemma African Americans faced in 
choosing between Blackness and Americanness as a state of 
double consciousness. Du Bois describes this dilemma as a 
state in which “one feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; 
two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two war-
ring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone 
keeps it from being torn asunder” (p. 5).
The idea of dual loyalties, or “two unreconciled striv-
ings,” has a long history; it was as a much a problem in medi-
eval political thought as it is today. However, dual loyalty 
was understood and accepted as part of the body-soul, or the 
constant contradictions between human bodily desires and 
religious obligations. Starting in the first half of the seven-
teenth century, however, the problem of dual loyalty became 
an inherent part of religious and political nationalism in 
Europe (Baron 2009) and a test against those who were con-
sidered outside the dominant social, political, and religious 
boundaries, particularly immigrants. One of the most signifi-
cant anti-immigrant movements in America, as we noted ear-
lier, occurred during the early decades of the twentieth 
century, when in 1904 the number of immigrants from east-
ern and southern Europe hit 812,870 and reached more than 
1 million in 1905 (Huebner 1906). During this era, Americans’ 
attitudes toward immigration centered on the potential eco-
nomic and cultural threats eastern and southern European 
immigrants were perceived to pose to traditional Anglo-
Saxon American values. All indications are that today, we 
may be facing a similar historical moment of heightened 
immigrant distrust and a generally negative perception of 
immigration and immigrants’ divided loyalty to American 
core culture.
Because the idea of loyalty is essentially a way of con-
structing symbolic codes that organize and construct sym-
bolic boundaries, we also draw on Lamont and Molnár’s 
(2002) discussion of the importance of symbolic boundaries 
as a primary vehicle whereby social actors characterize their 
social and physical environments (see also Edgell, Gerteis, 
and Hartmann 2006; Edgell and Tranby 2010; Kusow and 
Eno 2015). Symbolic boundaries are tools by which individ-
uals struggle with and come to agree upon the definition of 
reality, a means through which social actors put individuals 
into groups and generate feelings of similarities and differ-
ences and, ultimately, the essential means through which 
people acquire social status. Once they are collectively 
accepted and socially hardened, symbolic boundaries become 
social boundaries that produce objectified social differences 
that manifest in the unequal distribution of resources, status, 
economically driven patterns of interaction and association, 
and, most important, identifiable patterns of social exclusion 
and social inequalities. We specifically articulate the extent 
to which attitudes toward immigrants’ perceived loyalty to 
both their home countries and the United States can be used 
as a basis to construct symbolic boundaries that exclude 
immigrants from the social and political boundaries of 
Americanness.
Data, Methods, and Variables
Data were collected from a nationally representative random 
telephone survey (n = 2,081) conducted in 2003 by the 
University of Wisconsin Survey Center as part of the 
American Mosaic Project. As part of the project, households 
were randomly selected and respondents chosen randomly 
from within households. African Americans and Hispanics 
were oversampled to provide sufficient representation for 
making meaningful comparisons across racial and ethnic 
groups. The African and Hispanic American oversampling 
was achieved by calling more heavily in areas with high con-
centrations of these populations. Sample weighting was 
applied so that the resulting analysis reflected the population. 
The survey response rate was 36 percent, which compares 
well with other recent random-digit-dialing samples, includ-
ing the American National Election Study.
However, the data used in this study were derived from a 
subsample (n = 1,567) that included only U.S.-born persons 
with U.S.-born parents (Table 1). The purpose was to ensure 
that the views in question would be those of the native popu-
lation with no immediate immigrant origins. In other words, 
because first- and second-generation Americans constitute 
roughly 25 percent of the U.S. population, we wanted to 
ensure that the views of immigrants and their immediate 
descendants who may maintain dual loyalties were not con-
founded with those of natives and native parentage, whose 
views on dual loyalty are the topic of this research.
To retain as many cases as possible in our final sample, 
we imputed the data using multiple imputation. Imputing 
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data must be done with care given the increasing recognition 
that missing data present a serious a problem in surveys; 
indeed, it is very difficult to collect complete data from all 
respondents (Chinomona and Mwambi 2015; Lleras 2008; 
Stuart et al. 2009). Missing data can create conceptual bias 
and reduce and inflate statistical significance. Originally 
developed by Rubin (1987), multiple imputation is a flexible 
technique that is relatively easy to use and appropriate for a 
wide range of data sets (Stuart et al. 2009). Unlike single-
imputation techniques, such as mean imputation and maxi-
mum likelihood, which replace a single value with each 
missing value, multiple imputation imputes each missing 
value multiple times and calculates the right value to impute 
by accounting for data variability and uncertainty 
(Chinomona and Mwambi 2015; Lleras 2008).
Dependent Variable
Respondents’ extent of agreement with the statement “It’s 
OK for immigrants to be loyal to both their home country 
and the U.S.” was used to gauge Americans’ attitudes toward 
immigrants’ dual loyalty. Responses to this question were 
coded on a four-point scale that ranged from 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 4 (strongly agree).
For the purpose of these analyses, these response catego-
ries were recoded into a binary dichotomous variable, with 1 
representing those who disagree that immigrants can be loyal 
to both their home countries and the United States and 0 
representing those who agree with the central statement that 
it is acceptable for immigrants to be loyal to both their home 
countries and the United States.
Dimensions of Boundaries against Immigrants’ 
Dual Loyalty
We conceptualize boundaries against immigrants’ dual loy-
alty in terms of a number of dimensions: social location, spa-
tial location, cultural and political values, immigration-related 
boundaries, and racial and religious friendship heterogeneity. 
Cultural and political values refer to qualities respondents 
consider important, such as the importance of American val-
ues, American influence around the world, and political party 
affiliation. Important American core values and influence 
were derived from the questions “How important are 
American culture and values?” and “How important is 
American influence in the world?” Both variables were coded 
from 1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important). Political 
party affiliation was coded 0 for Democratic or 1 for 
Republican. The spatial location boundary referred to the 
U.S. regions in which respondents resided and was measured 
using binary codes to designate region of residence: South 
(the comparison region), Northeast, Midwest, or West. Social 
location refers to demographic and social class boundaries. 
This measure was assessed by including in the model multi-
ple variables that reflected respondents’ social classes and 
demographic characteristics. Age was measured in years from 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Independent Variable Description Mean or Percentage Standard Deviation
Sociodemographic characteristics  
 Age Age in years (18–93) 45.94 16.59
 Female 1 = female, 0 = male 54.2 —
 Education Level completed (1 = some high school or less, 6 
= postgraduate)
3.75 1.58
 Family income Total family income in 2003 (1 = $10,000 or less, 
8 = $100,000 or more)
— —
Spatial location  
 Northeast 1 = Northeast, 0 = other regions 19.5 .394
 Midwest 1 = Midwest, 0 = other regions 39.65 .461
 West 1 = West, 0 = other regions 20.38 .403
Cultural/political values  
 American values 1 = not important at all, 4 = very important 3.58 .607
 American influence 1 = not important at all, 4 = very important 3.27 .900
 Party affiliation 1 = Republican, 0 = Democratic or independent 35.5 .478
Immigration status  
 American tradition 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree  
 Immigrant shared vision 1 = not at all, 4 = almost completely agree 2.38 .883
 Attitudes toward immigration 1= strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree 3.66 .671
Friendship heterogeneity  
 Racial heterogeneity 1 = highest level of heterogeneity, 0 = lowest level 0.151 0.151
 Religious heterogeneity 1 = highest level of heterogeneity, 0 = lowest level 0.355 0.330
Sources: American Mosaic Project Survey (2003); 2000 U.S. census (Summary File 3).
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18 to 89. Extent of formal education was coded from 1 (some 
high school or less) to 6 (postgraduate). Total household 
income before taxes was measured using eight categories 
from 1 ($10,000 or less) to 8 (more than $100,000). Sex was 
coded as 1 (female) or 0 (male). Immigration boundary mak-
ing refers to how Americans perceive and relate to immi-
grants and immigration in general in terms of the extent to 
which Americans see that immigrants share their vision of 
America and celebrate American values, traditions, and atti-
tudes toward immigration through three variables. The first 
variable, shared vision, was derived from the question “How 
much do recent immigrants agree with your vision of 
American society?” The extent to which immigrants should 
celebrate American traditions was derived from the statement 
“Immigrants should celebrate American holidays and tradi-
tions,” and the third variable, attitudes toward immigration, 
was derived from the statement “The United States should do 
more to limit immigration.” All three variables were rated on 
a four-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree). Finally, friendship heterogeneity referred to 
the extent to which one is exposed to heterogeneous racial 
and religious friends. Racial and religious friendship hetero-
geneity boundary making is premised on the assumption that 
individuals who have wider circles of racially and religiously 
heterogeneous friends are less likely to hold negative atti-
tudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. Specifically, racial 
heterogeneity is based on the number of White, Black, 
Hispanic, Native American, and Asian individuals in a given 
person’s circle of friends. Religious heterogeneity refers to 
the number of Christian, Protestant, Catholic, Eastern 
Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and other reli-
gion friends in a given person’s friendship circle. Scores for 
both measures were either 0 or 1, with 0 being less heteroge-
neous and 1 being more heterogeneous (for an extensive dis-
cussion of these measures, see Blau and Schwartz 1984).
Univariate Analysis
To gain a baseline understanding of attitudes toward immi-
grants’ dual loyalty, we analyzed the distribution of the 
responses to our question of whether it is acceptable for 
immigrants to be loyal to their home countries and the United 
States at the same time (Table 2).
Responses to the question show that the overwhelming 
majority, 71 percent of respondents, agreed that it is 
acceptable for recent immigrants to maintain dual loyalty. 
The responses also show that a significant percentage, nearly 
29 percent of U.S.-born persons with U.S. parentage, believe 
that recent immigrants should not maintain dual loyalty and 
should therefore hold undivided allegiance to core American 
identities. Given the popular views, which generally lean 
toward the preference for undivided loyalty, it is surprising 
that so many Americans appeared to accept immigrants’ 
maintaining dual loyalty between their home countries and 
the United States. The ways in which these general patterns 
hold across different social groups and boundaries are exam-
ined and presented in Table 3.
Multivariate Analysis
We used a binary logistic approach to estimating the effects 
of the independent variables on the binary outcome variable 
that it is acceptable for immigrants to hold dual loyalty to 
their home countries and the United States. We used binary 
logistic regression instead of ordered logistic regression 
because we were specifically interested in the conceptual and 
analytical distinction between those who agree and those 
who disagree with immigrants’ dual loyalty rather than the 
ordered variation of the responses (Edgell et al. 2006). More 
important, identical models (available on request) with the 
dependent variable in its original scale measurement level 
using order regression or binary coded using logistic regres-
sion revealed that collapsing the response categories resulted 
in no loss of explanatory power in this study or in other stud-
ies that used the same data (Edgell and Tranby 2007).
Data Analysis and Results
The results of our analysis of nonimmigrant Americans’ atti-
tudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty are presented in Table 3. 
We describe the results in terms of the following boundary 
dimensions: social location, spatial location, cultural and politi-
cal values, immigration, and racial and religious friendship 
heterogeneity.
Social Location. As shown in Table 3, three of the four variables 
in the social location cluster (gender, education, and income) 
were not significant in structuring nonimmigrant Americans’ 
attitudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty; age was the only 
factor that had an effect. As shown in the table, older respon-
dents were more likely to disagree with the statement “It’s OK 
for immigrants to be loyal to both their home country and the 
U.S.” This finding is not surprising given that the younger 
generation has experienced increased exposure to different 
racial, cultural, social, and political groups as the result of the 
increased diversity in America, particularly since the 1990s. 
More important, perhaps, younger generations did not experi-
ence the racial controversies and conflicts of the 1960s and 
1970s (Schaller 2010). Family income was marginally signifi-
cant (p = .052) but showed an interesting finding in that 
Table 2. Responses to the Statement “It’s OK for Immigrants to 
be Loyal to Both Their Home Country and the U.S.”
Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage
Agree 1,133 71.3 71.3
Disagree 455 28.7 100
Total 1,588 100  
Source: American Mosaic Project Survey (2003).
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persons with higher levels of education were less supportive of 
immigrants’ dual loyalty.
Spatial Location. The nature of settlement patterns is an 
important dimension in attitudes toward immigrants’ dual 
loyalty. In the case of spatial location, our results show that 
those who resided in the Northwest and Midwest were less 
likely to disagree with the statement “It’s OK for immigrants 
to be loyal to both their home country and the U.S.” than 
were residents of the South and West. Residents of the North-
east were .678 times less likely to disagree with dual loyalty 
than were residents of the South and West. Those who resided 
in the Midwest were also .684 times less likely to disagree 
with dual loyalty than were residents in the South and West. 
These findings can be alternatively interpreted as showing 
that residents in the Northeast are nearly30 percent more 
likely to support immigrants’ maintaining dual loyalty to 
their home countries and the United States. Those who 
resided in the Midwest were also nearly30 percent more 
likely to support immigrants’ dual loyalty. Residence in the 
West was not significantly related to these attitudes.
Cultural and Political Values. Two of the variables that formed 
the cultural and political values boundary were derived from 
items that respondents saw as core strengths that make 
America what it is. The first pertained to the importance of 
American culture and values and the second to the impor-
tance of American influence in the world. The third variable 
was political party affiliation. As shown in Table 3, political 
party affiliation was the single most important variable in 
structuring attitudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty within 
the cultural and political boundary dimension. Those who 
identified as Republican were 1.63 times (60.3 percent) more 
likely to disagree with the idea of immigrants’ maintaining 
dual loyalty than were those who self-identified as Demo-
crats or independents. It appears that the importance people 
attach to American values is not significantly related to atti-
tudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. We found, however, 
that those who attached importance to American influence 
around the world were .732 times (37 percent) less likely to 
disagree with the statement “It’s OK for immigrants to be 
loyal to both their home country and the U.S.”
Immigration Boundary Dimension. Our results also reveal that 
the immigration-related boundary dimension appeared to be 
the most important conceptual cluster in nonimmigrant 
Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. The 
items in this cluster measured the extent to which 
Table 3. Binary Logistic Results of Americans’ Attitudes toward Immigrants’ Dual Loyalty.
Boundary Dimensions B SE Wald p Odds Ratio
Social location  
 Age .014 .004 14.008 .000 1.015
 Female −.065 .127 .265 .607 .937
 Education −.048 .043 1.252 .263 .953
 Family income .069 .036 3.782 .052 1.072
Spatial location  
 Northeast −.389 .190 4.181 .041 .678
 Midwest −.380 .163 5.461 .019 .684
 West −.007 .154 .002 .962 .993
Cultural/political values  
 American values .178 .107 2.737 .098 1.194
 American influence −.312 .092 11.545 .001 .732
 Republican .489 .125 15.338 .000 1.631
Immigration status  
 American tradition .267 .062 18.473 .000 1.306
 Shared vision with immigrants −.374 .073 26.317 .000 .688
 Attitudes toward immigration .333 .065 26.189 .000 1.395
Friendship heterogeneity  
 Racial friendship heterogeneity −.041 .278 .022 .883 .960
 Religious friendship 
heterogeneity
−.034 .188 .033 .856 .966
Constant −2.319 .000
Cases correctly classified 71.5  
Model χ2 (df) 181.428 (15) .000
−2 log likelihood 1,692.238  
n 1,567  
Source: American Mosaic Project Survey (2003).
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respondents perceived that immigrants should celebrate 
American traditions and share their vision of America or 
agreed with the statement that immigration should be 
restricted as much as possible. Those who believed that 
immigrants should celebrate American values and tradition 
disagreed with the statement that it was acceptable for immi-
grants to maintain dual loyalties between their homelands 
and the United States. The odds ratio for strongly agreeing 
that immigrants should celebrate American values and tradi-
tions was 1.306 times; that is, the respondents who felt that 
immigrants should celebrate American values and traditions 
were 30 percent more likely to disagree with immigrants’ 
maintaining dual loyalty, and those who strongly believed 
that the U.S. government should restrict immigration as 
much as possible were also 1.395 times (more than 30 per-
cent) more likely to disagree with the acceptability of dual 
loyalty. One of the most interesting findings relates to the 
sense of shared vision with recent immigrants. Those who 
believed that recent immigrants shared their vision of Amer-
ica were less likely to oppose immigrants’ dual loyalty; that 
is, these respondents were .761 times (more than 30 percent) 
less likely to oppose dual loyalty.
Discussion and Conclusion
A recent Los Angeles Times editorial titled “The Problem of 
Dual Citizenship” may have hinted at what we believe to be 
the question that may inform the next generation of scholar-
ship on immigrant assimilation, perceived lack of loyalty 
among individuals with immediate immigration background: 
“How can a person be equally loyal to two countries?” The 
question of whether individuals with recent immigration 
background can be assumed to be loyal to core American 
values, read patriotism, has figured prominently in the past 
three presidential election cycles, starting in 2008, and has 
been reignited by Donald Trump’s assertion that Ted Cruz, 
his rival for the Republican Party’s nomination, may not be 
eligible to hold office because he was born in Canada to an 
American mother and a Cuban father.
Trump’s comments have over the past few months led to 
a series of articles in the Washington Post by both journalists 
and constitutional scholars to provide arguments for (Adler 
2016; Barnett 2016; Katyal and Clement 2015; Marcus 2016) 
and against (McManamon 2016) Cruz’s status as a natural-
born citizen and therefore his eligibility for the presidency. In 
a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, Katyal and 
Clement (2015) noted that “someone born to a U.S. citizen 
parent generally becomes a U.S. citizen without regard to 
whether the birth takes place in Canada, the [Panama] Canal 
Zone, or the continental United States” (p. 161) and con-
cluded that
Senator Cruz has been a citizen from birth and is thus a ‘natural 
born Citizen’ within the meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, 
because his father had also been resident in the United States, 
Senator Cruz would have been a ‘natural born Citizen’ even 
under the Naturalization Act of 1790. (p. 162)
In contrast, McManamon (2016), another constitutional 
law expert, suggested that Ted Cruz is ineligible to be presi-
dent, arguing that the definition of a natural-born citizen must 
not be derived from the Constitution but from the British 
common law, upon which it is based. Quoting the eighteenth-
century English jurist William Blackstone, McManamon 
wrote that natural-born citizens are “such as born within the 
domains of the crown of England, while aliens are: such as 
born out of it” (p. 1). This controversy may not significantly 
affect Cruz’s eligibility status, but the suspicion has been 
planted, as shown by a recent Monmouth University poll in 
which nearly a third of Republican voters said that Cruz is a 
not a natural-born citizen or were not sure. This division and 
controversy, according to McManamon, “is the assumption of 
allegiance to one’s country of birth” (p. 1), which implies that 
individuals who are born outside the domains of the United 
States may not have the necessary allegiance and loyalties to 
lead the country patriotically.
The problem with all this media conversation is that it is 
merely as such, a debate, it lacks any empirical foundation, 
and most important it completely ignores what nonimmi-
grant Americans think about immigrants’ dual loyalty. We set 
out to extend the parameters of this discussion to include atti-
tudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty from the perspectives 
of nonimmigrant Americans, that is, native persons with 
native parentage. This new research question is extremely 
important in that unless we have a meaningful understanding 
of how nonimmigrant Americans perceive dual loyalty, the 
discussion of whether immigrants are loyal to American 
political and core values (de La Garza et al. 1996; Guarnizo 
et al. 2003; Huntington 2004; Pantoja 2005; Smith 2007; 
Stanton et al. 2007) is methodologically and theoretically 
incomplete. Conceptualizing immigrants’ dual loyalty from 
the context of reception provides an important window into 
the future conceptualization of two of the most important 
sociological issues in immigration research: the nature of 
assimilation and multiculturalism (Hartmann and Gerteis 
2005) and political participation in and connectedness to the 
American political system.
Our analyses reveal that certain boundary processes 
appear to be more important in structuring nonimmigrant 
Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. First, 
we found that social location variables such gender and edu-
cation did not affect one’s attitudes toward immigrants’ dual 
loyalty. Income was marginally significant (p = .052) but 
showed an interesting direction such that individuals with 
higher income levels are less supportive of immigrants’ dual 
loyalty. This finding, although not significant, may point to 
the fact that attitudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty may 
be empirically different from attitudes toward immigration. 
It also appears that the younger generation is more likely to 
support dual loyalty than their parents and grandparents.
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Second, our analyses reveal that spatial location appears 
to structure nonimmigrant American attitudes toward immi-
grants’ dual loyalty, such that those who live in the Midwest 
and Northeast oppose immigrants’ dual loyalty compared 
with those who live in the South. Residing in the West is not 
significantly related to attitudes toward immigrants’ dual 
loyalty. This finding is quite interesting in that it speaks to 
the possibility that the significant size of the Hispanic immi-
grant population in the western United States does not influ-
ence nonimmigrant Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants’ 
dual loyalty, thus casting doubt on Huntington’s (2004) argu-
ment that Latino immigrants, particularly those from Mexico, 
are unlikely to assimilate core American values.
Third, we find that the importance one attaches to 
American cultural and political values and American influ-
ence in the world affect nonimmigrant Americans’ attitudes 
toward immigrants’ dual loyalty in important ways. 
Specifically, we find that those who self-identify as 
Republicans are significantly more likely to oppose immi-
grants’ dual loyalty as opposed to those who self-identify as 
Democrats or independents. This finding is quite interesting 
in that it mirrors the prevailing ideological differences 
between self-identified Republicans and self-identified 
Democrats in terms of issues that pertain to immigration. The 
most interesting finding within this boundary cluster pertains 
to the importance one attaches to American influence in the 
world. Those who see American influence in the world as 
very important are also significantly more likely to support 
immigrants’ dual loyalty than those who do not see the 
importance of American influence in the world. We are not 
aware of prior empirical research that links these two vari-
ables, but it is possible for people to think that having 
Americans who maintain dual loyalty with their countries of 
origin may help contribute to America’s influence in the 
world, as casual American ambassadors, perhaps.
The fourth and most important finding pertains to our 
immigration-related boundary dimension. Those who agree 
that the United States should limit immigration as much as 
possible and that immigrants should celebrate American cul-
ture and tradition are significantly more likely to oppose 
immigrants’ dual loyalty. The most fascinating finding within 
the immigration boundary dimension is the revelation that 
those who believe that immigrants share their vision of 
America are significantly more likely to support immigrants’ 
dual loyalty.
We hope that this exercise provides an important starting 
point for future directions to broaden our understanding of the 
nature and dynamics of nonimmigrant Americans’ attitudes 
toward immigrants’ dual loyalty. A more comprehensive artic-
ulation of the implications of nonimmigrant Americans’ atti-
tudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty, however, requires more 
robust data, a further specification of the conceptual model 
provided here, and more theoretically conceived variables 
than the items from the survey from which we extracted our 
data. Future research should consider creating multiple-item, 
scale-based measures that can capture attitudes toward immi-
grants’ dual loyalty. More important, a more robust under-
standing of dual loyalty requires both historical and contextual 
variables that can address the different social, economic, and 
political contexts that inform America’s perceptions and atti-
tudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty.
The findings indicate that gaining a better understanding of 
the American people’s acceptance of dual loyalty is important 
for two reasons. First, to the extent that immigrants’ engage-
ment of dual loyalty is informed by the context of the host 
environment, an understanding of the social climate of the 
host community is extremely imperative. More important, 
without a full understanding of the American people’s percep-
tion of immigrants’ dual loyalty, the controversy over whether 
immigrants’ dual loyalty is either incompatible with or com-
plementary to core American values is theoretically incom-
plete (Escobar 2004; Huntington 2004; Kozak 2009). What is 
clear from the findings is that immigrants’ dual loyalty also 
influences nonimmigrant Americans’ understanding of the 
increasing level of global interdependence. That is, as immi-
grants become more engaged with their countries of origin and 
the United States at the same time in their activities and behav-
ior, the American people might become more open in their 
attitudes toward immigrants’ dual loyalty as well. 
Consequently, instead of solely concentrating on the ways in 
which contemporary immigrants maintain dual loyalties, fur-
ther understanding of how nonimmigrant Americans reacts to 
immigrants’ dual loyalty will provide an important insight into 
our understanding of the nature and implications of immigra-
tion on America’s national identity and core values and the 
ways in which immigrants and nonimmigrant Americans have 
been and continue to reflect on each other in the making and 
remaking of American social, economic, and political values.
Our discussion of nonimmigrant Americans’ attitudes 
toward immigrants’ dual loyalty brings back issues of assim-
ilation in all its forms—cultural, social, economic, and even 
health—in that like all other immigrant behaviors, dual loy-
alty may also be tied to general patterns such that later gen-
eration will leave it behind. There is in fact an increasing 
amount of research showing that later generations start to 
resemble the mainstream American population even in anti-
social behavior such that nativity as a protective factor 
against criminological tendencies wanes with each succes-
sive generation (Vaughn et al. 2014). Given these findings, it 
may be the case that the tendency for immigrants to maintain 
dual loyalty with their home countries and the United States 
may wane with successive generations, and therefore, the 
recent sociological concerns about lack of loyalty among 
immigrants may not even be a social issue.
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